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Authors Reply: We described a scenario of a highly accurate
screening test in which we randomly manipulated the preva-
lence of the disease (i.e. pre-test probability).1 The estimation
of post-test probability was possible for all arms of the study
except one, in which no information on prevalence was
provided. As pointed out by Galen, the option “cannot be
determined” was not proposed to that group, because we
wanted to use the same response scale for all versions of the
scenario. Instead, we expected a higher rate of missing
answers, but this did not happen. In fact, for about 90% of
physicians, the estimation of post-test probability was not
influenced by disease prevalence, whether it was provided or
not.
We agree with Galen that computing the post-test probabil-
ity of disease may be cumbersome and of limited usefulness for
everyday diagnosis at the bedside. However, the aim of our
study was not so much to test the exact arithmetic skills
necessary for Bayesian calculations, for which many aids exist,
but rather to assess whether physicians are aware of the
relationship between pre-test and post-test probability when
confronted with the result of a diagnostic test. We expected that
respondents would adjust the range of their post-test estima-
tion according to a prevalence varying between 1% and 95%. To
our surprise, most physicians seemed to consider that
diagnostic testing yields a fixed probability that characterizes
the test’s performance.
Ignoring the importance of pre-test probability when inter-
preting test results could result in unnecessary testing, patient
anxiety, and even diagnostic errors. For example, without going
as far as computing the exact post-test probability, it would be
incorrect to rule out pulmonary embolism on the basis of a
negative D-Dimer test when the pre-test probability is high.2 It
is true that well conceived clinical guidelines can incorporate
Bayesian principles into their proposed algorithms, but it is
important that physicians remain aware of the reasons that
underlie these recommendations. Moreover, this knowledge is
crucial for the assessment of the numerous new diagnostic
tests that are regularly brought to their attention.
We believe that our results should prompt the exploration of
new approaches for teaching Bayesian principles and their
implementation in clinical practice. New didactic models have
been proposed3, as well as a wider use of graphical reporting of
diagnostic information.4 However these new decision aids will
go to waste if doctors do not even realize that they may need
them.
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